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1 Introduction 
Multi-sided platforms (MSPs) are among the most powerful and valuable 
business models of today. Hagiu (2014) defines MSPs as “technologies, products 
or services that create value primarily by enabling direct interactions between 
two or more customer or participant groups”. The success of such business 
models is illustrated by technology-based MSP companies like Google, Apple, 
Facebook, and Amazon, often together referred to as GAFA, that are among the 
most valuable companies in the world. These companies can be considered 
“platform leaders”, who Gawer and Cusumano (2002) define as “companies that 
drive industry wide innovation for an evolving system of separately developed 
pieces of technology”. These companies have different roots: Google’s in 
internet Search, Apple’s in computer system development, Facebook’s in social 
media, and Amazon’s in online book retail. However, today these companies are 
facing each other increasingly as competitors in industries that appear to be 
away from their roots, in fields such as mobile phone operating systems, 
advertising, self-driving cars, entertainment, and many others. In an 
increasingly digital environment, understanding the strategies these companies 
employ helps companies across industries to better capitalize on their own 
platform initiatives. The role of acquisitions for platforms is an essential yet 
under-researched topic, and the current research from mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A), platform, or information system (IS) fields do not properly 
explain the platform leaders’ M&A activity. Thus, this thesis seeks to answer the 
research question:  
Why do platform leaders acquire? 
Platform leaders’ acquisitions follow a different set of rationales than traditional 
M&A rationales. While M&A deals come in different types, the platform leaders 
like GAFA focus almost exclusively on technology acquisitions: the acquisition of 
companies with technological assets. This focus on technology M&A is no 
surprise, as MSPs are dependent on the digital technology that powers their 
interactions and network effects. To simplify, technology acquisitions can be 
justified either by gaining access to the target’s business, or by gaining access to 
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target’s technological assets and capabilities, or both. In the case of business 
benefits, a platform company might acquire a target to bring in users to its own 
platform.  
When technology companies acquire technological resources, the acquisitions 
often follow a build or buy -decision, where the acquiring company evaluates 
whether they have the time, skills, and resources to build a needed technology 
themselves, or if they need to acquire the technology. Cohen (2012) supports 
this unique rationale in technology acquisitions, arguing that the unique needs 
such as tapping into innovative potential of young, entrepreneurial firms, 
obtaining engineering capabilities, keeping key employees of the acquired 
company, and quick integration of acquired technology into acquirer’s core 
business make technology M&A unique from other sectors. Scholars have also 
suggested that firms utilize acquisitions as a means of innovation (Puranam and 
Srikanth, 2007), achieving strategic renewal (Agarwal and Helfat, 2009), and to 
acquire scarce resources held by internet firms (Uhlenbruck, Hitt and Semadeni, 
2006). In this context, acquirers benefit from the ability to integrate new 
technologies quickly. Benitez-Amando and Ray (2012) suggest IT integration 
capability and flexible IT infrastructure enable companies to pursue M&A 
opportunities and help them realize the economic benefits, which partially 
explains large technology companies’ high M&A activity.  
While technology acquisitions can be utilized to access new technologies, they 
have also become a recruiting tool. Most successful technology companies have 
begun to utilize a novel tool of acqui-hiring, the practice of acquiring relatively 
small companies for their talent, to satisfy their demand for engineering talent 
and capabilities (Coyle and Polsky, 2013). While access to talent is seen as an 
important driver of these acquisitions, Sawicki (2015) also highlights access to 
patents as an additional benefit of this approach over simply hiring a start-up’s 
engineers. Sometimes, rare world-class digital talent can lie only in small, yet 
successful ventures, making the incentives of traditional recruiting less 
compelling if the key talent has equity in the venture. Facebook, for example, 
acquired a Malaysian two-person company Octazen Solutions in 2010 to gain 
access to some of the world’s best talent in the field of web scraping (Arrington, 
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2010). However, the current research has not yet focused on creating a model 
that would explain what specifically drives such costly measures when the 
acquirers are platform leaders. 
Platform companies utilize different acquisition strategies at different stages of 
their development. One of the determinants of acquisition strategy is 
organizational slack, excess resources available for use. A higher amount of 
organizational slack increases experimentation activity, which can result in 
identifying and pursuing new opportunities (Levinthal & March, 1981). This 
slack is often higher for more developed companies, suggesting a more active 
and varying acquisition activity for more developed platform companies.  
General platform strategies also vary for platforms at different stages of 
development. To initially create a platform, Gawer and Cusumano (2008) 
suggest a coring strategy. The strategy includes four possible technology-related 
actions: solving an essential system problem, facilitating provision of add-ons by 
external companies, keeping intellectual property of your technology closed, 
and maintaining strong interdependencies between the platform and its 
complements. In this strategy, the focus for the platform company is to develop 
“unique, compelling features that are hard to imitate and that attract users” 
(Gawer and Cusumano, 2008). While platform companies might want to speed 
up this process by utilizing technology acquisitions, many successful platform 
companies started entrepreneurially and would be hindered in such efforts by 
the lack of excess resources. However, the current research has not explored 
what kinds of acquisitions could be important enough for platform companies to 
make at this stage.  
For fighting platform wars at later stages of platform development, Gawer and 
Cusumano (2008) suggest a tipping strategy, also commonly known as 
“platform envelopment” (Eisenmann, Parker and Van Alstyne, 2011). In this 
strategy, the technology-related actions for the platform company are to 
“absorb and bundle technical features from an adjacent market” (Gawer and 
Cusumano, 2008). In contrast to the focused development in an early stage 
platform coring strategy, the focus shifts into a more competitive one. At this 
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stage, the platform company would typically have gained some success and 
would thus be more likely to have organizational slack to enable technology 
acquisitions. Furthermore, such acquisitions could help platform companies in 
their platform envelopment efforts. However, the viability of a platform 
business model is dependent on the platform’s ability to produce network 
effects. Compared to a conventional supplier-buyer perspective where 
increased competition can be observed as a reduction in market share, a 
platform’s market share might vanish completely if a hostile platform 
envelopment attack manages to draw enough participants from the platform to 
drastically reduce its network effects. In this environment, a technology 
acquisition by a competitor could prompt an extensive competitive response, as 
the acquired technologies could enable a hostile platform envelopment attack. 
Regardless, the current research has yet not explored how platform leaders 
utilize acquisitions in support of and in defense to a platform envelopment 
strategy. 
Scholars have long argued that complementarity is an important feature of 
successful M&A. Bauer and Matzler (2014) find evidence for the decisive role of 
strategic complementarity for post-merger integration and overall M&A 
success, and Grill and Bresser (2013) suggest that acquisitions benefit the 
acquirer when both the acquirer and target possess strategically valuable 
capabilities. Hildebrand et al. (2015) also find that car original equipment 
manufacturers (OEMs) who acquire complementary and heterogeneous 
external knowledge on digital technologies and possess the ability to integrate 
and commercialize the knowledge, are better prepared to digitally transform 
their business. Additionally, Wang and Zajac (2007) find that companies favor 
acquisitions over alliances more often when their resources are similar. 
Utilizing the software stack model and the distance between layers as a measure 
of complementarity, Gao and Iyer (2006) also find a link between superior M&A 
performance and technological complementarity between the acquirer and 
target. While complementarity has been found to positively impact M&A, there 
is still clear demand for conceptual work on the construct of complementarity 
(Bauer and Matzler, 2014). 
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The existing M&A research has not addressed how value is created by acquirers 
who are operating in digital industries and organized in value networks, or how 
the acquired technology is related to the acquirer’s technology (Toppenberg, 
Henningsson and Eaton, 2016). Toppenberg, Henningsson and Eaton (2016) 
address this gap in their study about the technology acquisitions made by Cisco, 
finding that they used ‘coring acquisitions’ to buy technologies that could give 
the primarily hardware-focused company a head-start on competition to create 
a more software driven ecosystem. However, their study focuses on the 
technology acquisitions that help to create an ecosystem, rather than on how to 
use them to compete when an ecosystem or platform already exists. The study 
also identifies complementarity between hardware and software, but does not 
explicate between different kinds of software. Furthermore, Cisco is an 
established company, while many platforms are created by entrepreneurial 
companies with scarce resources. Thus, the current research still lacks in 
explaining what types of technologies are complementary to platform 
companies and why, how entrepreneurial platform companies use technology 
acquisitions in support of their coring strategy, and how technology acquisitions 
are used during platform wars. 
While making acquisitions can help companies build their technological 
capabilities, other platform literature provides a lens to understand how these 
capabilities, often referred to as information system capabilities, can benefit the 
development of platforms and give them competitive advantage. Tan et al. 
(2015) suggest that IS capabilities have an evolutionary nature in MSP 
development, and propose that different information system capabilities are 
crucial in different stages of MSP development. Leaning on the Resource-Based-
View, Wade and Hulland (2004) find potential for sustained competitive 
advantage in hard to transfer information system technical skills, information 
system development capabilities like managing a system’s development life-
cycle, and cost effective information system operations. However, Koch and 
Windsberger (2017) argue that traditional strategic models of competitive 
advantage like Resource-Based-View, industry structure view, or dynamic 
capabilities approach, are built on assumptions that are no longer valid in 
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today’s digital environments. Industries are no longer relatively stable but 
rather turbulent, planning has become more challenging and is replaced with 
ability to adapt to changes, and value creation has shifted from products made 
by individual companies to collaborative networks, such as platforms. Thus, it is 
highly relevant to take a more network-based approach to understand 
acquisition rationales of platform companies.  
To cope with these changes, drawing on network theory, Koch and Windsberger 
(2017) suggest that an inter-organizational network structure, where resources 
and capabilities extend beyond firm boundaries, is the primary source of 
competitive advantage in an environment where industry boundaries are 
dissolving and digital technologies are a focal point of value creation. They 
further suggest that acquisitions are made to support the inter-organizational 
network structure of a company’s business, which is essentially how MSPs 
operate, but they recognize that their model lacks the granularity to explain 
which specific interactions or technologies of a platform are key to building 
competitive advantage in the digital economy. 
The software stack model provides a structure to understand how the 
technological assets held by platform companies are intertwined, as well as how 
they relate to the technologies these companies acquire. Information technology 
companies like IBM have long approached the issue of technological relatedness 
with a layered architecture called the stack or the software stack (Gerstner, 
2003; Gao and Iyer, 2006). This thesis seeks to integrate the technology M&A, 
platform, and information systems research with a software stack model. The 
integrated view is then tested with a group of competing platform leaders, the 
GAFA companies.  
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2 Theory 
2.1 Technology framework 
The abundance and interdependency of digital technologies have created a need 
for structuring and modeling them. As this thesis deals with technology 
acquisitions of platform companies, it needs to utilize a theoretical model to 
both categorize the different technologies and to understand how they relate to 
each other and the platform core. Somewhat similarly to this thesis, 
Toppenberg, Henningsson and Eaton (2016) study a platform leader Cisco’s use 
of acquisitions in its shift from a hardware-based platform core to a software-
based one. However, they do not utilize a clear model to structure the nature of 
its acquisitions complementarity to its platform core. As there is a large variety 
of different kinds of software, a simple division of technologies to software and 
hardware is too generic. For example, grouping Google’s Android and 
Facebook’s social media website under one software category would hide 
essential information about the nature of the software, how it contributes to a 
platform, and what kind of strategies it can enable. To identify patterns in 
acquisition behavior of multiple platforms and study how their platform core 
affects the acquisitions they make, the differences and similarities between 
technologies need to be more granularly structured. 
Information technology companies like IBM have long approached this issue 
with a layered architecture called the stack or the software stack (Gerstner, 
2003; Gao and Iyer, 2006). The stack model expands the software category into 
multiple different subcategories, and provides a perspective to how software in 
these categories relate to and operate with each other and with hardware. 
Essentially this layered architecture allows similar digital technologies to be 
grouped into layers that can interact with other layers based on a set of rules. 
2.2 Software stack perspective to acquisitions on platforms 
Based on the work by Gao & Iyer (2006) on measuring M&A complementarities 
with a software stack model, this thesis utilizes a similar layered model seen in 
Figure 1 to categorize technology companies into technology layers. The stack 
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model serves as a framework for understanding digital technology components 
and their interplay, but also to understand how these different technologies can 
be used to conduct business. 
Layering enables the analysis of interdependencies between different units of 
software, and Gao and Iyer (2006) found evidence that the distance between 
layers in the stack model can be used as a valid measure of complementarity. In 
general, technologies in the same layer are most similar, and the similarity 
decreases as the distance between layers grows (Gao and Iyer, 2006). 
Bachmann et al. (2000) define layering as dividing software into units where 
each unit represents a layer. Each layer represents a virtual machine that is “a 
collection of software that together provides a cohesive set of services that 
other software can utilize without knowing how those services are 
implemented” (Bachmann et al., 2000). Bachmann et al. (2000) also note that 
virtual machines are only allowed to use the services of layers below it, either 
one layer or more apart depending on the utilized layering scheme. This thesis 
utilizes a layering scheme illustrated in Figure 1, where each technological 
component belongs to a layer, and can vertically only utilize services of other 
components one layer below itself, and horizontally also services from other 
components in the same layer. Application Software (AS) layer is the only 
exception in the horizontal interaction rule, as it only provides services to users 
rather than other technology components. 
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The four layers shown in Figure 1 are defined as follows: 
- Application Software (AS): The highest layer of the stack. Includes end-
user facing software with a user interface, and directly uses Middleware 
Services (MW) to operate. It provides, or can provide, its services to 
multiple end users, but not to other AS components. 
- Middleware Services (MW): The layer connecting AS and System 
Software (SS). Includes software components that can be used as 
services providing for multiple AS or other MW components. MW 
components utilize services from SS to handle operating with Hardware 
(HW), but does not directly connect to HW. Middleware is “reusable 
software that leverages patterns and frameworks to bridge the gap 
between functional requirements of applications and the underlying 
operating systems, network protocol stacks, and databases” (Schmidt 
and Buschmann, 2003). 
- System Software (SS): Technology components that abstract the use of 
Hardware (HW) to provide an interface for further software 
development. System Software (SS) can be utilized by multiple MW or 
some other SS, but cannot be used directly by AS. Such components 
include, for example, kernel, operating systems, databases and other 
large scale storage, cloud, and codecs. SS components provide libraries 
used by other SS or MW components, and are often directly compiled 
into machine language.  
- Hardware (HW): Physical hardware components, such as memory, 
CPUs, and other semiconductors. Hardware components can provide 
services to multiple different SS components, but not to MW components 
directly. HW components connect to other HW as well, and the layer also 
includes the interoperability of HW components, the design of hardware 
systems, and their positioning to a physical chassis. 
Digital offerings are built of separate technological units that, when connected, 
form software stacks that produce a set of services for users. These 
Figure 1 The software stack used in this thesis 
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technological units are digitally operating assets, software or hardware, that 
require specific technical capabilities to be created. Each technological 
component belongs to one of the stack layers, and each layer holds multiple 
similarly operating technological components. Thus, every digital component in 
the Application Software (AS) layer requires the utilization of technological 
components in each of the lower layers. However, most companies only 
specialize in one or few layers of the stack and rely on third parties to provide 
the technology for the rest of the layers (Gerstner, 2003). Generally, a fully 
outsourced stack is easier to imitate as the used technology is available to 
anyone, and a fully in-house software stack is harder to imitate as third parties 
might not offer suitable substitutes for the used in-house technologies. 
MSPs can also be seen to have their platform core, their own components, in 
specific layers of the stack. Like Cisco had their ecosystem core initially in 
hardware (Toppenberg, Henningsson and Eaton, 2016), in the software stack 
model platform companies can be seen to have their platform core in AS, MW, 
SS, or HW layers. Other companies with technology components in these same 
core layers are then more related to the MSP’s technology, and through 
complementarity they would also be generally more valuable as technology 
acquisition targets than companies with technology in other stack layers.  
Unlike some generally used stacks (Gerstner, 2003; Gao and Iyer, 2006), this 
thesis uses a stack that leaves out a services layer due to two key conflicts. 
Firstly, the service layer is often placed above the AS layer (Gerstner, 2003; Gao 
and Iyer, 2006), implying that it depends on the services provided by AS layer. 
However, Application Software is the final piece of technology connecting the 
digital solution to a user, and cannot serve any technological components on top 
of it. Secondly, the service layer contains third party support services that help 
to build or manage technological components in each of the four stack layers 
(Gerstner, 2003), and thus relates to all four layers of the stack, rather than just 
one. Due to these reasons, in this thesis the service layer is distributed along the 
stack. In the stack shown in Figure 1, each individual service layer component is 
contained in the layer where the corresponding technology resides. This 
collapses the service nature of these components, but keeps their technological 
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relatedness intact. In practice, this means that technological capabilities are 
treated similarly to technological assets - after all, technological capabilities 
enable these assets to be built.  
The stack model has important implications for structure of the industry 
competition (Gao and Iyer, 2006). In the lower layers technologies serve as a 
foundation for new software to be developed on top of, and a key success factor 
for companies here has been the ability to establish highly integrated platforms 
with high switching costs (Gao and Iyer, 2006). However, in the AS layer at the 
very top, there are no technological components to provide the services to, and 
thus the competition is focused on attracting end users. This dynamic makes the 
technological components business-to-business (B2B) offering in all but the 
highest AS layer, where also business-to-consumer (B2C) offering is present.  
Companies can offer third parties individual components from specific layers, 
up to complete digital solutions built from components across all layers, to 
allow them to provide digital products or services. Furthermore, companies can 
also focus on building their own software stack, focusing on providing services 
to end users with it. However, there is no limitation to doing both, as companies 
can both use their own stack with some own components to provide digital 
services to end-users, as well as providing individual components or groups of 
them to third party companies. However, offering stack components to third 
party companies is a two-way street. In the mobile ecosystem, opening platform 
resources can simultaneously help extract appropriated relational rents, as well 
as expose the platform to exploitative competitive attacks like platform forking 
(Karhu, Gustafsson and Lyytinen, 2018). Additionally, opening some 
components to third parties can be beneficial to both parties, whereas providing 
others might create a competitive threat to the potential buyer of the 
component. In the case of IBM in 1980s and 1990s, their presence in AS layer 
hurt their business opportunities in providing their components from lower 
layers to competing companies as they were simultaneously potential suppliers 
and competitors (Gerstner, 2003). However, this was the case for IBM whose 
main business is selling software and hardware systems rather than to provide 
software-enabled user-facing service. In the case of companies like Google, 
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Apple, Facebook, and Amazon, presence in multiple layers is less likely to cause 
conflicts, as their most important customers are users. Rather, their presence in 
multiple layers might be a necessity to be able to provide their service to end 
users. 
Another consequence of the layer interaction dynamics is that the number of 
technology components grows higher when moving up in the stack. In general, 
when developing a digital service, the more re-usable components are used, the 
faster the execution. In an optimal case only AS software is developed, and no 
new technology is created to MW, SS, and HW layers. In the software stack, 
components need to be compatible with the components one layer below, and 
lower level components are often maintained as platforms. For example, 
operating systems in SS layer foster a community of developers that develop 
compatible Middleware Services components for them. Increasing the amount 
of operating systems would create the need to re-create the MW components, 
thus keeping the switching costs high in lower layers, and keeping the amount 
of technology there lower than higher layers. However, this effect is offset to an 
extent when distance between components in the stack grow larger, as a longer 
distance reduces the need to adjust the component in higher layer when a lower 
level component changes. Regardless, in the AS layer there is no next layer that 
would depend on the AS software, which allows a large variety of AS to be 
created, but also makes AS less unique than software in lower layers. Acquiring 
a company focusing in the AS layer is thus more likely to be beneficial due to 
gaining access to the users of the technology, rather than its value as a scarce, 
hard to imitate IS asset. 
2.3 Hypotheses generation 
As scalable MSPs are based on technology, they have a platform core that 
consists of components in certain layers of the software stack. At their early 
days, platforms should place focus on acquiring companies with technology in 
these core layers of the platform. By utilizing a coring strategy, platforms can 
utilize IS technical skills and IS infrastructure in establishing a unique and 
compelling value proposition fundamental to the platform (Gawer and 
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Cusumano, 2008). Tan et al. (2015) find Alibaba to have leveraged experience 
and technical expertise to develop IS infrastructure on their online platform in 
its nascent stage of development. In support, Hagiu (2007) argues that 
platforms should be careful when considering horizontal expansion, because “it 
needs to trade off the synergies, economies of scale and/or network effects 
created by novel search or shared costs reductions against the increasing 
complexity costs and diseconomies of specialization, which occur when the 
platform acquires new dimensions”, and suggests that instead of expanding to a 
MSP, a dominant two-sided platform could be enough. Hagiu (2007) further 
suggests that before seeking to expand with new functionalities, platforms 
should first focus on developing their core platform. To enable this focused 
development, firms can utilize acquisitions as a means of innovation (Puranam 
and Srikanth, 2007) or to substitute internal R&D (Bower, 2001), but also to 
simply obtaining engineering capabilities (Cohen, 2012). However, Santos and 
Eisenhardt (2009) found that entrepreneurial companies also acquire potential 
entrepreneurial rivals to ensure they won’t outcompete them, meaning that 
these targets are also technologically related to the acquirer. In either case, 
research suggests platform companies should first focus on acquiring 
companies from same stack layers, leading to the hypothesis: 
Hypothesis H1: In the earlier stages of platform development, platform leaders 
acquire targets with technology at the acquirer’s platforms’ core layers. 
To gain competitive advantage in the long term, research suggests that platform 
companies should seek to improve their speed and ability to improve their 
platforms. Yang, Nam and Kim (2017) suggest that keystone firms in mobile 
ecosystem should acquire companies that allow them to develop and grow their 
main business areas, especially the platform. Furthermore, they indicate that 
platform enhancement could be the most important factor in gaining 
competitive advantage in the mobile ecosystem. Hagiu (2007) argues that the 
most successful MSPs are constantly evolving by increasing their depth and/or 
reach, while redefining their own and industry boundaries in the process. Koch 
and Windsberger (2017) similarly propose that in environments of high 
digitalization, firms can gain sustained competitive advantage if they actively 
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shape their competitive environment and co-create value with interconnected 
firms. Tan et al. (2015) also suggest two strategies for a mature stage platform: 
a meshing strategy of fostering solidarity and mutual dependencies between the 
platform members, and an empowering strategy where the platform members’ 
ability to participate and contribute on the platform is enhanced.  
Companies have long suffered from overlapping work, as multiple parallel 
projects continuously rediscover and reinvent core concepts in writing the 
Application Software, slowing down development speed and increasing the 
costs (Schmidt and Buschmann, 2003). All technology in layers other than AS 
are reusable by nature, as they provide services to components in their own 
layer or the one above. However, as most software is developed in the AS layer, 
in general the largest benefit to software development speed should be with 
middleware, which by Schmidt and Buschmann’s (2003) definition is essentially 
reusable software. MW components can help to improve the innovation speed of 
the platform owner, but also the innovation speed of certain platform 
participants, if the components are released to their use. These considerations 
regarding the innovation speed and middleware’s reusability lead us to the 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis H2: In the later stages of platform development, platform leaders 
each acquire targets with reusable software components to increase their 
ecosystem’s innovation speed. 
The software stack model also links together similar technologies across 
different platforms, regardless of the domain they are used in. The 
interoperability of software is solved with middleware, which is “reusable 
software that leverages patterns and frameworks to bridge the gap between 
functional requirements of applications and the underlying operating systems, 
network protocol stacks, and databases” (Schmidt and Buschmann, 2003). MW 
provides services to help both the MW and AS layers. However, MW can also 
benefit lower SS level offerings by being bundled together with them. For 
example, a machine learning library in the MW layer could be bundled up with 
SS level cloud computing platform, offering the library only for customers of the 
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cloud computing platform, and thus creating lock-in to the cloud platform for 
anyone who uses the library. SS layer is also located in the stack between two 
other layers, and technologies in the layer could similarly create value to 
multiple platform cores. Thus, the more platform cores a company has in any of 
the layers of the software stack, the more synergy potential technology 
acquisitions can have to the company. In practice, such synergies could be 
gained with MW acquisitions when the acquirer has AS and SS cores, and with 
SS acquisitions when the acquirer has MW and HW cores. A company naturally 
builds more IS assets as it develops, and hence platforms at a later stage of 
development should receive more benefits from technology acquisitions. These 
considerations lead us to the hypothesis: 
Hypothesis H3: In the later stages of platform development, platform leaders 
acquire targets with technologies that simultaneously provide benefits to multiple 
of the acquirer’s platforms’ core technologies. 
While acquisitions are often studied from the perspective of acquirers and 
targets, they are not isolated events in a static competitive landscape, and thus 
the competitive dynamics need to be considered. Acquisitions related to another 
company’s businesses are perceived as a larger increase in competitive tensions 
and threat, which prompts more complex competitive response (Uhlenbruck et 
al., 2017). Similarly, Uhlenbruck et al. (2017) find less related mergers with less 
resource similarity to have the opposite effect as they appear to loosen 
competitive tensions. Companies use acquisitions to enhance their power and 
eliminate competitive threats, especially when the targets could be used by a 
competitor as a market entry ‘stepping stone’, or if the target itself is a 
potentially serious rival (Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009). Platform companies are 
under competitive pressure to expand into new functionalities or customer 
groups, as competing platforms can attack your home base by expanding in the 
reverse direction (Hagiu, 2007). New IS capabilities might be required for the 
expansion, and Cohen (2012) identifies acquisition often as the fastest, if not the 
only, way to keep up with technological developments. Platform companies 
could thus use strategic acquisitions to prevent competitors’ access to the IS 
capabilities needed for hostile platform envelopment attacks. 
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Just as technology fundamentally enables MSPs, it also allows them to expand. 
Digital technologies develop at a fast pace to directions hard to predict, and 
talent is scarce. In this environment, acquiring a technology can mean the ability 
to deliver a new feature or functionality, but also that a competitor will struggle 
to do the same. As GAFA, the case companies in this thesis, compete against each 
other in fields like Social Media, Mobile devices, Advertising, Virtual assistants, 
and Cloud, among others, they are good examples of companies operating 
competing platforms, thus being in a common platform war. Gawer and 
Cusumano (2008) suggest the copying and development of new features as a 
key strategy to win platform wars. Especially when their user bases overlap, 
platform companies face both a risk and opportunity of envelopment as users 
are immediately given access to use a functionality in an alternative platform. 
However, the technologies enabling the envelopment opportunities can be very 
specific, whereas the stack model lacks the granularity to make a difference 
between them. Based on these findings and considerations, the following 
hypothesis is constructed: 
Hypothesis H4: In the later stages of platform development, different platform 
leaders with overlapping user bases acquire targets with technology assets in 
similar kinds of technologies. 
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3 Methodology 
This thesis takes a multiple case study approach to understand why platform 
leaders acquire technology companies. The study combines both qualitative and 
quantitative methods, and this section describes the research methodology in 
detail. 
3.1 Case companies and data 
Apple, Facebook, Google (Alphabet), and Amazon were selected as the case 
companies based on the dominant position of their ecosystems in industries 
such as Cloud computing, eCommerce, Computer devices, Social networks, and 
Search. At the time of writing this thesis, Google is a company under the 
corporate parent Alphabet, but in this thesis the name Google is used to refer to 
the full company portfolio of Alphabet. The M&A deal information used in this 
thesis originates from Zephyr M&A database, and the data processing is 
outlined in Table 1. Deals were searched with the company names shown in 
Table 1, limiting data to deals with assumed or confirmed completion date 
between 1/1/1900 and 31/10/2017, and including only acquisitions where the 
acquirer reaches a 100% ownership of the target company. Only fully acquired 
targets are considered, because full ownership is often required for fusing the 
target and its technological assets completely to the acquiring company. 
Additionally, there were no acquisitions fitting these search criteria with 
Alphabet Inc. as the acquirer, and thus only acquisitions made by Google Inc. are 
considered. 
After receiving this data from Zephyr, deals with no completion date were 
excluded. Finally, information about each deal company was retrieved and 
coded as outlined in section 3.4 Data analysis below, and non-technology 
related deals were excluded to reach the final number of 324 acquisitions.  
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Table 1 Deal data selection 
Number of deals Amazon.com 
Apple 
Computer 
Inc. 
Facebook 
Inc. 
Google 
Inc. 
All M&A deals 168 119 84 273 
Excluding out of 
time range and 
non-completed 
114 82 67 218 
Excluding non-
Acquisitions 
54 69 65 170 
Zephyr total 54 69 65 170 
  
   
  
Excluding blank 
dates 
52 67 55 155 
Excluding non-
technology and 
unknown 
companies 
49 66 55 154 
Final 
acquisitions 
49 66 55 154 
 
To support the hypothesis testing, recent revenue data was also collected from 
the annual reports of the case companies, together with the distribution of the 
revenue to the company’s segments. This revenue data serves to help analyze 
what technology layers are core to the case companies. 
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Figure 2 Acquisition data snapshot 
An Excel snapshot of some relevant fields of the data is shown in Figure 2. The 
fields for acquirer, acquisition target, and their business descriptions are 
directly given by M&A deal database Zephyr. The data in primary layer field, 
which illustrates the acquisition target’s key layer of technology, is produced in 
a process detailed in section 3.4 Data analysis below. 
3.2 Stages of platform evolution 
To make a difference between platforms at different stages of development, 
scholars have suggested multiple alternative stage models, as well as a 
continuous model of platform evolution (Staykova and Damsgaard, 2017). 
Research suggests that successful platform companies seek to continuously 
improve their speed and ability to improve their platforms, and as seen in Table 
2, the case companies are still growing their revenues despite them being 
already significant. Thus, I argue that current platform evolution models are 
insufficient as platform leaders continuously develop their platforms. Instead, I 
propose to distinguish between two time periods, early stage and later stage, 
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primarily based on the competitive dynamics outlined in Table 3 below. Hagiu 
(2007) suggests that platforms should first focus on developing their core 
platform before seeking to expand with new functionalities, and thus platforms 
can be seen to first develop to fulfill their core purpose, and later to expand and 
compete with other platforms. Similarly, Gawer and Cusumano (2008) structure 
platform strategies into creation of platforms with a coring strategy, and 
platform wars with a tipping strategy. Hence, platforms can be seen to go 
through two competitive phases: first, a phase of focused development where 
the company seeks to develop its core platform, followed by a phase of multi-
platform competition, where companies compete with multiple other 
companies with potentially multiple different platforms. 
Table 2 Growth rates and revenues of GAFA companies 
  CAGR* 2012 - 2016 
Revenue 2016,  
$USD billion 
Google 15,8 % ~90  
Apple 6,2 % 229** 
Facebook 52,7 % 28  
Amazon 22,1 % 136 
*Compound Average Growth Rate 
** Financial Year 2017, Q4/2016 – Q3/2017 
 
This thesis seeks to uncover the acquisition strategies during platform wars, 
and thus it is necessary to observe acquisitions in a period when such wars are 
undeniably happening. While it is difficult to pinpoint an exact moment when 
platform competition between GAFA intensified, it is arguably clear that they 
were directly competing already in early 2010s. For example, Google launched 
Android to compete with Apple’s iOS in 2008 (Google, 2008), Google Storage to 
compete with Amazon’s cloud offerings in 2010 (Kincaid, 2010), and social 
network Google+ in late 2011 to compete with Facebook (Halliday, 2011), while 
also facing long-term competition from Facebook in online display advertising, 
and Amazon in product search advertising. To account for any lag in strategy 
development and deployment, as well as lead times in negotiating and 
preparing acquisitions, acquisition behavior should be affected by these and 
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many other attempts of platform envelopment by at least end of 2012. The 
competition has all but eased later on, as for example the GAFA are currently all 
developing technology in the Virtual assistant field (Amit, 2017). Thus, this 
period of intensified competition is arguably depicted by acquisitions completed 
from at least 2013 to 2017. Hence, deals are grouped into two time periods: 
1) Deals completed during 2012 or before, denoted as early stage, depicting 
a phase of focused platform development 
2) Deals completed during 2013 or after, denoted as later stage, depicting a 
phase of multi-platform competition 
The characteristics of these stages are shown in Table 3. The early stage depicts 
the characteristics of an entrepreneurially developed platform, and thus might 
differ from a platform developed by an established company. In the early stage, 
the priority is to make sure the platform works for what it was built to do. This 
involves acquiring users/other participants, and focused development of 
platform core. As the scope is strict and resources limited, competitively the 
focus is to react to immediate threats, also highlighted by the coring strategy 
employed by the companies at this stage. At the later stage, the platform’s 
strategic focus has shifted into exploration of new functionalities. With some 
success already achieved, the platform is better resourced for this exploration. 
Competitively the focus shifts more to active strategizing, and platform 
envelopment is utilized to attack competing platforms. At this stage, there can 
also be more defensive competitive actions to protect the platform from 
immediate and future envelopment attacks. 
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Table 3 Strategies of early and later platform stages 
  Early stage Later stage 
Strategic 
focus 
Ensuring platform serves 
its core purpose, 
platform monetization 
Exploring ways to further 
enhance and expand the platform, 
and to protect from envelopment 
attacks  
Competitive 
strategy 
Reactive Active 
Platform 
strategy 
Coring Tipping/Envelopment 
 
3.3 Hypotheses testing 
This thesis tests four individual hypotheses, which are outlined together with 
their corresponding test variables in Table 4. The key underlying attribute used 
in testing each hypothesis is the number of acquisitions. The variable is chosen 
as this thesis seeks to understand what kinds of companies platform leaders 
acquire. The variable represents the intensity of acquisitions, and thus enables 
us to evaluate the relative importance of different types of acquisition targets. 
Deal size in terms of monetary or employee count could be alternative variables 
of interest, but is not used in this thesis. This is because technology acquisitions 
are usually characterized by young, entrepreneurial targets (Cohen, 2012), and 
where acquiring relatively small companies for their talent is frequent (Coyle 
and Polsky, 2013). Target companies that have talent in a quickly developing 
and advanced field, such as AI, are often smaller as their technology might not 
be mature enough for a scalable business model. Hence, using deal size would 
mean that a few large acquisitions, like Facebook’s 19 $USD billion acquisition 
of WhatsApp, would hide any meaningful insights of the full spectrum of a 
technology company’s acquisition behavior. Additionally, technology companies 
frequently keep acquisition details private, and using deal size as the variable 
would force the use of less reliable estimates by the media to access the data. 
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Table 4 Hypotheses and test variables 
  Hypothesis Test variable 
H1 
In the earlier stages of platform 
development, platform leaders acquire 
targets with technology at the acquirer’s 
platforms’ core layers 
Share of acquisitions in 
platform core layers at early 
stage 
H2 
In the later stages of platform 
development, platform leaders each 
acquire targets with reusable software 
components to increase their 
ecosystem’s innovation speed 
Share of acquisitions in 
Middleware Services layer at 
later stage, and changes in 
both deal counts and shares at 
layers between early and late 
stage 
H3 
In the later stages of platform 
development, platform leaders acquire 
targets with technologies that 
simultaneously provide benefits to 
multiple of the acquirer’s platforms’ 
core technologies 
Share of acquisitions in layers 
sandwiched by core layers at 
later stage, and changes in 
both deal counts and shares at 
layers between early and late 
stage 
H4 
In the later stages of platform 
development, different platform leaders 
with overlapping user bases acquire 
targets with technology assets in similar 
kinds of technologies 
# of acquisitions in the same 
fields by competing companies 
 
All the hypotheses are generated in the section 2.3 Hypotheses generation. Due 
to the farming of the hypotheses, hypothesis H1 analyzes the deals with their 
completion date in the early stage, but hypotheses H2, H3, and H4 focus on the 
data from the later stage. Hypothesis H1 uses the percentage of acquisition at 
platform’s core layers as the test variable, which derives directly from the 
hypothesis as discussed in section 2.3 Hypotheses generation, and uses an 
additional analysis defining what the companies’ platform core layers are. 
Hypothesis H2 concerns the reusable components, potentially benefitting both 
the platform leaders and their platform complementors, and is measured by 
percentage of all acquisitions in the middleware layer, because as discussed in 
section 2.3 Hypotheses generation, Middleware Services components have the 
most reusability potential of the stack layer. It could be argued that system 
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software components are also reusable, as they can certainly provide services to 
multiple Middleware Services components. However, system software 
components have been left out as the hypothesis deals with innovation speed, 
and as there are far less Middleware Services than there is Application Software, 
MW components carry significantly more potential to improve a platform’s total 
innovation speed. 
Similarly, hypothesis H3 is tested with the stack model, using the percentage of 
acquisitions located on layers between a company’s two core layers, using the 
additional analyses of the companies’ platform core layers as used in hypothesis 
H1. For H3, MW and SS layer acquisitions are the focus, as they are the only 
layers that have layers both above and below them. Hypotheses H2 and H3 also 
reflect on the change in acquisition amounts and shares in stack layers between 
early and later stages, because it serves to highlight the changes in acquisition 
behavior between the stages. This in turn adds more context around the later 
stage figures, helping to understand how to interpret the figures and what the 
magnitude of the shift is. Additionally, taking the absolute number of deals into 
account in explaining the changes in the shares of acquisitions helps to avoid 
misinterpretation of the data. 
Unlike the other hypotheses, hypothesis H4 is tested with the number of 
technology categories companies have in same technology fields. The 
technologies enabling the envelopment strategies used by the case companies 
can be very specific, whereas the stack model lacks the granularity to make a 
difference between them, a shortcoming also identified by Gao and Iyer (2006). 
One might argue that other layers have important technology, but as illustrated 
by the data of this thesis, the case companies all put increased focus on 
middleware at the later stage, implying that the layer is especially important for 
them all. Hence, only the acquisitions in middleware layer are categorized to 
more granular technology groups for further analysis, and are used to test 
hypothesis H4 by analyzing the overlaps of acquisitions in the same technology 
categories.  
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3.4 Data analysis 
After the initial data collection outlined in section 3.1 above, the case 
companies’ current business segments as of late 2017 were coded into the stack 
layer. This analysis utilized publicly available sources of the companies’ 
offerings, as well as the revenue and other data describing the company’s 
business from their annual reports. 
Acquisition targets were then individually coded into a layer in the software 
stack based on the description of their business. Previous studies utilizing the 
stack model use industry codes like Standard Industry Codes (SIC) to categorize 
companies into layers (Gao and Iyer, 2006), but the industry categories can be 
very generic and inaccurate, and thus risk the data validity if used. Although a 
highly laborious process, each acquisition target was categorized manually to 
avoid the data validity problem. As the targets are often small companies, the 
deals are coded to a single key layer based on where the target company’s key 
unique technical assets or capabilities reside. The layers and the stack model are 
described in detail in the section 2.2 Software stack perspective to acquisitions 
on platforms. Business descriptions from Zephyr were the primary source of 
description data, but for 55% of the deals they were insufficient and thus 
supplemented with secondary information from company websites and other 
online sources. The distribution of data source for coding is shown in Table 5.  
Table 5 Business description data sources 
  Amazon.com 
Apple 
Computer 
Inc. 
Facebook 
Inc. 
Google 
Inc. Total 
Zephyr 32 13 40 61 146 
Media/Web 17 53 15 93 178 
Total 49 66 55 154 324 
 
After coding acquisition targets to the stack layers, the categorized deals were 
analyzed by case company, using the tests outlined in section 3.3 above.  
After analyzing the deal data from the stack layer perspective, deals in the 
middleware category were coded further into specific areas of technology. The 
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deals were first openly coded technology categories, and the first created 
technology categories were then further collapsed into fewer final categories 
where initial categories had significant overlaps. This data was analyzed by 
looking at all four case companies simultaneously. The acquisitions were each 
grouped into one technological group based on the information about the 
acquisition target’s technological focus. However, it is important to note that 
these categories do not dictate how the technology will be used, but rather, the 
technology categories provide proxies to what the specific technology is able to 
do. For example, visual recognition technology can be used in multiple ways, 
and thus could support for example Search or AR/VR technologies, which are 
separate categories.  
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4 Findings 
In this section, I first introduce each case company and the distribution of their 
business along the software stack, and analyze their acquisition behavior 
individually. After the case company specific view, I analyze the acquisition 
behavior of all the case companies together. 
4.1 Four cases 
This section introduces each case company, explaining the results from the 
perspective of each individual company, covering the hypotheses H1, H2, and 
H3. 
4.1.1 Google 
Founded in late 1998, Google is best known for its internet products like the 
Google Search, but over time has expanded operations to areas quite far afield 
from its main internet products (Page, 2015; Alphabet, 2017a). While formally 
Google is owned by its parent company Alphabet, in this thesis any offerings 
under Alphabet’s portfolio are referred to as Google offerings. Most of Google’s 
revenues comes from its advertising business in the MW layer, but it also has an 
emerging cloud business in the SS layer, Virtual assistant and Mobile devices in 
the HW layer, as well as SS in the Android mobile phone operating system. 
Regardless, Google’s business is still heavily focused on the AS and MW layers of 
the software stack. 
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Table 6 Main revenue sources of Alphabet in 2016 (Alphabet, 2017b) 
Layer Business segment Share of revenue 
AS 
Google Search,  
Gmail,  
Google Maps,  
… 
- 
MW 
Advertising*, 
Google Play store 
88% 
0 - 12% 
SS 
Google Cloud,  
Android 
0 - 12% 
HW Devices 0 - 12% 
Total  ~90$USD billion 
*Includes only revenue from 3rd party ad placements, own ad placements allocated to AS 
 
Table 6 shows the distribution of Google’s corporate parent Alphabet’s revenues 
by business segment, and shows how these segments are distributed across the 
software stack. While it clearly highlights how important advertising is for 
Google, it is important to note that not all revenue is generated by Google’s own 
AS properties - advertising on Google’s own and third party properties 
accounted for 71% and 17% of Alphabet Inc.’s revenues respectively in 2016 
(Alphabet, 2017b). However, Google’s own AS remains the most important 
source of its advertising space. As Google’s focus was in advertising for quite 
long and the new offerings have taken time to show in their bottom line, I 
consider the AS and MW layers as Google’s core layers in the early stage, but the 
entire stack as core in the later stage. 
In the case of Google, AS contains its own end user facing services such as 
Google Search, which are its most important source of advertising space. On the 
other hand, MW contains the advertising engine that generates the revenue and 
serves ads to both the different AS’s of Google, as well as third party AS’s that 
provide the rest of Google’s advertising space. However, Google as a case 
highlights the complexity of the linkages between technological layers, as having 
the Android OS in the SS layer enables Google to get revenues from the Play 
Store MW. Similarly, Google’s own AS enables it to generate its revenues with its 
advertising MW. In Table 6, the revenue is allocated to the layer that powers the 
monetized interaction.  
Luiro 10.4.2018 
 29 
Table 7 Google's acquisitions at early and later stages 
  Number of acquisitions Share of acquisitions 
Layer Early Later Early Later 
AS 26 7 29 % 11 % 
MW 45 45 51 % 69 % 
SS 14 9 16 % 14 % 
HW 4 4 4 % 6 % 
Total 89 65 100 % 100 % 
 
Looking at the acquisitions of Google in Figure 3 and Table 7, before 2009 
Google had an acquisition intensity of 10 or fewer per year, which then 
accelerated to 27 acquisitions in the peak activity years 2010 and 2014. Table 7 
also illustrates the focus of Google’s acquisitions in its early stage, with 80% of 
acquisitions in the AS and MW layers where Google’s core business technology 
resides, supporting the H1 hypothesis. 
However, Google’s emphasis between the AS and MW layers has shifted 
between early and later stages. The share of AS acquisitions dropped from 29% 
to 11%, and MW increased from 51% to 69% between these two periods. The 
high share of middleware acquisitions in the later stage supports hypothesis H2. 
On the other hand, in the SS and HW layers acquisition intensities have 
remained small but rather constant, with SS acquisition intensity changing from 
16% to 14%, and HW from 4% to 6% between the time periods. The increase in 
the share of MW acquisitions is mainly due to an increase in the amount of MW 
acquisitions per year, climbing from 4.50 acquisitions per year at early stage to 
11.25 acquisitions per year in the later stage.  
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Figure 3 Number of Google's yearly acquisitions by stack layer 
MW and SS layers, which are sandwiched between Google’s core layers, 
accounted for 83% of all acquisitions in the later stage, and Google can thus 
receive synergistic benefits from these acquisitions. However, this was driven 
by MW acquisitions, while SS acquisitions reduced in both absolute numbers 
and share, suggesting that SS acquisitions might not be as beneficial. Thus, the 
results do not support hypothesis H3. 
4.1.2 Apple 
Apple Computer Inc. was founded in 1976 as a company developing computer 
systems, but has since expanded to new fields like, operating one of the most 
successful mobile platforms, and entertainment (Rawlinson, 2017). As seen in 
Table 8, while Apple’s ecosystem has expanded to include products and services 
in all layers of its stack, it still made 199$USD billion or 87% of its revenues 
from HW layer device sales on fiscal year ending Sep. 30th 2017, iPhone 
accounting for the majority of it (Apple, 2017). In the same period, revenue from 
services 30$USD billion accounted for the remaining 13% of Apple’s revenues. 
While these figures highlight how critically important HW is for Apple, it is 
important to note that Apple’s current ecosystem could not exist without MW 
layer components that generate the network effects in the ecosystem. While SS 
level operating systems are crucial to the devices in making them different from 
competition, MW level services like the App store play a critical role in the 
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device user experience and generate considerable revenues for Apple. While the 
service revenue was 12$USD billion or 8% of Apple’s revenues in financial year 
2012 (Apple, 2012), I interpret MW as core only at the later stage. Thus, Apple’s 
core layers at early stage are HW and SS, and HW, SS, and MW at later stage.  
Table 8 Main revenue sources of Apple in FY2017 (Apple, 2017) 
Layer Business segment Share of revenue 
AS - - 
MW 
Apple Pay 
Digital Content and Services 
13% 
SS iOS, OS X … - 
HW Devices 87% 
Total  ~229$USD billion 
 
Despite its long history, Apple has only really activated in making acquisitions in 
the 2010s, having made only a quarter of its acquisitions before the period as 
seen in Table 9 and Figure 4. Before 2013, Apple made 25% of its all 
acquisitions in the HW, dropping significantly to 12 % of all acquisitions in the 
period after, despite the magnitude of revenue made in this layer. Between the 
same periods the share of SS acquisitions fell from 21% to 17%, AS acquisitions 
grew from 4% to 10%, and MW acquisitions grew from 50% to 60% of all 
acquisitions. The high share of MW acquisitions at the later stage supports the 
hypothesis H2. For Apple, the increased share of MW acquisitions was due to an 
increase in the amount of MW acquisitions, climbing from 0.75 acquisitions per 
year before 2013 to 6.25 acquisitions per year in the period after. 
Table 9 Apple's acquisitions at early and later stages 
  Number of acquisitions Share of acquisitions 
Layer Early Later Early Later 
AS 1 4 4 % 10 % 
MW 12 25 50 % 60 % 
SS 5 7 21 % 17 % 
HW 6 6 25 % 14 % 
Total 24 42 100 % 100 % 
 
Luiro 10.4.2018 
 32 
The share of Apple’s acquisitions support the H1 hypothesis to an extent, 
although the share of acquisitions at Apple’s core layers of SS and HW total to 
47% of all acquisitions at the early stage, and thus the non-core layers account 
for a 53% majority of acquisitions. However, as the software stack dynamics 
suggest, HW and SS companies are rarer than MW and AS companies, and in the 
case of Apple, the distribution of acquisitions is clearly skewed towards the 
lower layers.  
 
Figure 4 Number of Apple's yearly acquisitions by stack layer 
Apple’s later stage platform cores are in MW, SS, and HW, but their acquisitions 
in SS layer lost share, indicating that synergy potential would not drive 
acquisitions in sandwiched layers, suggesting hypothesis H4 should be rejected. 
However, this reduction was caused by the increasing total acquisition volume 
mostly in the MW layer, as SS layer acquisitions grew in numbers from 5 to 7 
from early to later stage. Thus, results remain inconclusive for hypothesis H3. 
4.1.3 Facebook 
Founded in 2004, Facebook is known for its Social Media Network (Bellis, 
2017). While the AS of the service is at the very core of Facebook, the 
monetization of the platform is done with MW. While Facebook also made 
efforts in developing MW for app development in its platform, 97 % of their 
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2016 revenue was brought in by their advertising MW that serves ads mainly to 
their own social media platform AS (Facebook, 2017). In contrast to Google, 
Facebook does not have significant revenues from serving advertisements on 
3rd party AS. While MW can be seen as Facebook’s key revenue source, their 
ability to generate revenue is tightly dependent on their ability to serve 
advertisements to their own AS, and thus its core layers are MW and AS. 
Table 10 Main revenue sources of Facebook in 2016 (Facebook, 2017) 
Layer Business segment Share of revenue 
AS Social media service - 
MW 
Payments and other fees 
Advertising 
3% 
97% 
SS - - 
HW - - 
Total  ~28$USD billion 
 
Aligned with Facebook’s revenue sources, 95% of all its acquisitions seen in 
Table 11 and Figure 5 have been in the AS and MW layers. This strongly 
supports the hypothesis H1. While more of the acquisitions were AS in 
Facebook’s early stage, the balance has shifted towards MW in the later stage. 
The share of AS acquisitions has dropped from 69% before 2013 to 34% after, 
while the share of MW has increased from 31 % to 55 % in the same period. The 
high share of MW acquisitions at the later stage supports the hypothesis H2. 
Facebook has also made two SS layer and one HW layer acquisitions, all in the 
period after 2013.  
Table 11 Facebook's acquisitions at early and later stages 
  Number of acquisitions Share of acquisitions 
Layer Early Later Early Later 
AS 18 10 69 % 34 % 
MW 8 14 31 % 48 % 
SS 0 3 0 % 10 % 
HW 0 2 0 % 7 % 
Total 26 29 100 % 100 % 
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The increase in the share of MW acquisitions is mainly due to an increase in the 
amount of MW acquisitions per year, climbing from 1.33 per year before 2013 
to 3.50 per year during the period after. While these MW acquisitions are 
adjacent to Facebook’s core AS layer and may complement technologies in 
Facebook’s other core layer, MW, there is no apparent platform core at SS layer 
that these acquisitions could complement and thus the case is not applicable for 
testing hypothesis H3. 
 
Figure 5 Number of Facebook's yearly acquisitions by stack layer 
4.1.4 Amazon 
Founded in 1995, Amazon started out as an online book retailer, but has since 
expanded to selling a variety of other goods online, providing cloud computing 
services, and to selling Kindle book reading devices (Hall, 2017). However, not 
all these segments are alike. Table 12 shows the distribution of Amazon’s 
revenues and profits by its major business segments and highlights the key 
software stack layers of each segment. While Amazon makes 91% of its 2016 
revenue with AS in its eCommerce segment and only 9% with SS in its Amazon 
Web Services (AWS), in terms of operating income they account for 26% and 
74% of total respectively (Amazon, 2017). While Amazon has operated AWS 
since 2006 (Miller, 2016), its share of Amazon’s total revenue was only roughly 
3.6 % on Q4/2012 (Owen, 2013), and thus we argue it wasn’t core to Amazon 
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before the later stage. Additionally, the devices segment receives small attention 
in Amazon’s annual report or reported revenue figures, and I argue that it isn’t 
core to Amazon. Hence Amazon’s core layers are AS in the early stage, and AS, 
and SS in the later stage. 
Table 12 Main revenue sources of Amazon in 2016 (Amazon, 2017) 
Layer Business segment Share of revenue Share of profit** 
AS eCommerce 90% 26% 
MW Advertising* 1% - 
SS 
Amazon Web 
Services (AWS) 
9% 74% 
HW 
Amazon Web 
Services (AWS) 
Devices 
- - 
Total  ~136$ USD billion ~4.2$ USD billion 
*Revenue estimate by Barclays (Elder, 2017). eCommerce includes Advertising profits. 
**Operating income 
 
As seen in Figure 5, Amazon has been rather inactive with acquisitions before 
2008, and in general has been quite focused on acquiring companies in the AS 
layer, which accounts for 87% of all its acquisitions at its early stage. This 
clearly supports hypothesis H1. However, this AS acquisition share dropped to 
31% in the later stage. Simultaneously, the share of MW acquisitions increased 
from 9% to 54%, and share of SS acquisitions increased from 0% to 12%. The 
high share of MW acquisitions at later stage supports the hypothesis H2. HW 
acquisitions remained at 1 acquisition per period, corresponding to 4% of total 
acquisitions at each stage.  
Table 13 Amazon's acquisitions at early and later stages 
  Number of acquisitions Share of acquisitions 
Layer Early Later Early Later 
AS 20 8 87 % 31 % 
MW 2 14 9 % 54 % 
SS 0 3 0 % 12 % 
HW 1 1 4 % 4 % 
Total 23 26 100 % 100 % 
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The rise in the share of MW acquisitions is mostly explained by increased 
amount of MW acquisitions, which have increased from 0.14 acquisitions per 
year at the early stage to 3.50 acquisitions per year at the later stage. As MW is 
adjacent to the AS and SS layers that are core to Amazon at later stage, the MW 
acquisitions can synergistically provide benefits to multiple core layers of 
Amazon, supporting hypothesis H3. However, in the case of Amazon this result 
is limited to synergies from MW acquisitions and cannot fully support the 
hypothesis as SS synergy potential cannot be analyzed, and thus the result gives 
mixed signals. 
 
 
Figure 6 Number of Amazon's yearly acquisitions by stack layer 
4.2 Cross-case findings 
This section covers the results for testing hypothesis H4, and examines the case 
companies together, rather than separately. All the relevant case-specific 
insights are explained individually under the sub-sections of section 4.1 Four 
cases above. 
While the case companies appear to similarly focus their acquisitions on their 
core technology layers, they have also increased their acquisitions of targets 
focusing in the MW layer, both in absolute amounts of acquisitions as well as 
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share of all acquisitions. This section takes a deeper look at the kinds of 
technologies developed by the acquired companies in this layer, to further 
understand what makes MW interesting and if the interests are shared by the 
case companies at the later stage. The technological categories here reflect the 
technological focus of the target companies. Even though the target companies 
might have a very different use cases and industry focuses, the technologies are 
not bound by industry boundaries, and two acquisition targets in the same 
technology category with seemingly different focuses likely still have high 
technological relatedness. In addition, technologies from different categories 
can also be highly related and ultimately be used for the same use case, such as 
Speech Recognition/Generation and Virtual assistants. However, the 
categorization used here does not speculate on the use case of the technology, 
and does not always link these technologies. Hence, this categorization uncovers 
less relatedness than the technologies can potentially have. 
Figure 7 shows all the middleware acquisitions made by the case companies at 
the later stage, grouping the acquired companies by their respective technology 
area. Most frequent categories with 15 acquisitions include Software (SW) 
development tools, which contain a variety of general technologies that directly 
enable faster SW development process and higher quality outputs. The same 
amount of 15 acquisitions is also reached by Visual Recognition, which contains 
technologies that enable the identification of objects from image or video data. 
All case companies have made acquisitions in both technology categories, 
highlighting a common interest in the technology.  
These ‘M&A battles’ are characteristic of the MW acquisitions, and are found, at 
least to some extent, in most of the MW technology categories identified in this 
thesis. Figure 7 and Table 14 demonstrate these battles by showing the amount 
of acquisitions in each technology category.  
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Figure 7 Middleware acquisitions at later stage 
 ‘acquisition battles’ are seen in advertising technology between Facebook and 
Google, with one and six acquisitions respectively. This is the only category 
where Facebook and Google are the only ones of the case companies making 
acquisitions, which is logical considering that are the only ones with significant 
portions of their revenue being generated through advertising. 
Apple and Google are battling in Analytics with two and five acquisitions 
respectively, but also in Maps/Mobility with five and two acquisitions 
respectively, and Virtual assistants with two and one acquisitions respectively. 
The Maps/Mobility and Virtual assistant acquisitions could demonstrate the 
competition in Mobile Operating Systems, while Virtual assistants also link to 
Smart Home solutions. The Analytics acquisitions relate to multiple sectors like 
entertainment and health, but are ultimately based on similar kinds of 
technologies. 
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Table 14 Middleware acquisitions at later stage 
  Google Apple Facebook Amazon 
Advertising 6 0 1 0 
Analytics 5 2 0 0 
AR/VR 0 2 5 0 
Audiovisual media tools and 
platforms 5 1 1 0 
Data mining, management 
and processing 1 2 0 1 
Generic AI/ML 4 0 0 0 
InfSec 4 0 0 0 
Maps/Mobility 2 5 0 0 
NLP 3 0 0 2 
Payments 0 0 0 4 
Search 1 1 1 1 
Simulation 1 0 0 0 
Speech 
recognition/generation 0 1 2 1 
SW development tools 8 3 3 1 
Virtual assistant 1 2 0 0 
Visual recognition 4 6 1 4 
Total 45 25 14 14 
 
Facebook and Apple compete in AR/VR, where both have made five and two 
acquisitions respectively. Facebook could utilize such technology for improving 
the user experience on its platform, while Apple could benefit from the 
technology in developing the user experience of its mobile phones.  
Two technology categories had attracted acquisitions from three of the case 
companies. Amazon, Apple, and Google have targeted companies in audiovisual 
media tools and platforms –category one, two, and one times respectively. 
Speech recognition/generation technologies on the other hand has attracted 
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Amazon, Apple, and Facebook to acquire one, one, and two companies 
respectively.  
Three categories, however, have acquisitions from each of the case company. 
Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google all had 1 acquisition in Search, which is a 
very general purpose technology. SW development tools had one, three, three, 
and eight acquisitions respectively, while Visual recognition had four, six, one, 
and four acquisitions respectively.  
The data also highlights that every platform leader is acquiring technologies 
related to developing superior user interface and user experience, be it visual, 
written, or spoken methods. On the visual side, Facebook and Apple are buying 
Virtual Reality / Augmented Reality technologies, and all case companies are 
buying Visual recognition technology. On the written and spoken side, Google 
and Amazon are buying Natural Language Processing (NLP) technologies, Apple, 
Facebook, and Amazon are buying Speech recognition or generation 
technologies, and Google and Apple are buying Virtual assistant technology. 
While these technologies enable many functionalities, they can all be used for 
improving user interactions with a platform. 
Table 15 Overlapping technology categories in MW acquisitions 
  Google Apple Facebook Amazon 
Google   8 5 5 
Apple     6 5 
Facebook       4 
Amazon         
 
Table 15 summarizes the amounts of overlapping technology categories, and 
highlights overlapping acquisitions between each pair of case companies, each 
such pair having four to eight technology categories that are present in 
acquisitions of both companies. With 16 total technological categories, there is a 
clear tendency to acquire similar technologies, supporting hypothesis H4. 
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4.3 Findings summary 
This section draws from the analysis hypotheses presented in section 4.1 Four 
cases above to summarize the results for each hypothesis. The hypotheses and 
their test variables are summarized in Table 16, and the results of the testing 
are summarized for each case company in Table 17. I find support across the 
cases for hypotheses H1, H2, and H4, but for H3 the results are mixed and point 
towards rejection of the hypothesis. While it can be argued that the software 
stack generalizes technologies too much, because a single software stack layer 
might include a multitude of different technologies that might not be as related, 
the hypotheses arise from existing research and models. Thus, the results still 
serve to provide some validation to the existing research in the stack model 
context, as well as to add validity to the stack model as a framework to 
understand technology-based platforms. 
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Table 16 Summary of hypotheses 
  Hypothesis Test variable 
H1 
In the earlier stages of platform 
development, platform leaders acquire 
targets with technology at the acquirer’s 
platforms’ core layers 
Share of acquisitions in 
platform core layers at early 
stage 
H2 
In the later stages of platform 
development, platform leaders each 
acquire targets with reusable software 
components to increase their 
ecosystem’s innovation speed 
Share of acquisitions in 
Middleware Services layer at 
later stage, and changes in 
both deal counts and shares at 
layers between early and late 
stage 
H3 
In the later stages of platform 
development, platform leaders acquire 
targets with technologies that 
simultaneously provide benefits to 
multiple of the acquirer’s platforms’ 
core technologies 
Share of acquisitions in layers 
sandwiched by core layers at 
later stage, and changes in 
both deal counts and shares at 
layers between early and late 
stage 
H4 
In the later stages of platform 
development, different platform leaders 
with overlapping user bases acquire 
targets with technology assets in similar 
kinds of technologies 
# of acquisitions in the same 
fields by competing companies 
 
The data supports the hypothesis H1, suggesting that platform leaders at their 
early stage acquire companies with technology in their core layers. Google, 
Facebook, and Amazon had 80 to 95% of their acquisitions in these core layers, 
although Apple only had 47%. However, Apple’s core layers are lower in the 
stack where the stack model suggests acquisition targets are rarer, and thus the 
47% share can be seen to at least partially support the hypothesis as well.  
The data also supports hypothesis H2, suggesting that technology acquisitions 
can serve a role in platform leaders’ attempts to increase their ecosystem’s 
innovation speed. The share of MW acquisitions was 54-69% for Google, Apple, 
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and Amazon, while Facebook had a slightly smaller share of 48%. However, 
Facebook is the youngest of the case companies, and might lag behind the other 
case companies in its phase of development. Additionally, Facebook grew its 
share of MW acquisitions from 31% to 48%, showing an increased interest in 
MW acquisitions. This growth of the share of MW acquisitions was also visible 
for all other case companies, supporting the notion that innovation speed 
becomes more important when reaching a stage of multi-platform competition. 
Table 17 Summary of results 
  Google Apple Facebook Amazon 
H1 X (X) X X 
H2 X X (X) X 
H3 -- (  ) 
 
(  ) 
H4 X X X X 
 X  
(X)  
(  ) 
-- 
 
= Supports  
= Partially supports 
= Mixed signals 
= Does not support 
= Not applicable  
 
The data does not support hypothesis H3, suggesting that platform leaders 
might not acquire companies in technology layers sandwiched by the acquirer’s 
platform core layers in hopes of synergies with platform core layers. In the case 
of Amazon, some support was found for such benefits in MW acquisitions, as 
their share grew significantly between early and later stage. However, Amazon 
does not have synergy potential in acquiring SS layer targets as it does not have 
the HW layer as core. In the case of Google both MW and SS layer synergies were 
possible. However, Google’s MW acquisitions increased, but the SS acquisitions 
reduced in both share and count, ultimately suggesting a reversed impact. In the 
case of Apple, the results remained mixed for SS layer acquisitions, and MW 
layer was not applicable. The test was not applicable to Facebook, which does 
not have any core layers beyond AS and MW, making it impossible to acquire 
companies with technology in a layer sandwiched between Facebook’s core 
layers. However, all companies had a rather high share of MW acquisitions at 
the later stage, despite only two of them had platform cores in AS and SS, 
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suggesting that the synergy potential is not a driver of platform leaders’ 
technology acquisitions. 
The data points consistently towards accepting hypothesis H4, suggesting that 
platform leaders make technology acquisitions in same fields as their 
competitors as a competitive measure. The competition is also observed 
between each pair of case companies, each such pair having four to eight 
technology categories that are present in acquisitions of both companies. Some 
of these overlaps happened with only a single acquisition by one or more 
companies, but the overlaps still signal competition, as the technological fields 
are mostly scarce in talent and companies and more attractive targets might 
simply not be available. 
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5 Discussion and conclusions 
This thesis set out to answer the question ‘Why do platform leaders acquire?’, 
approaching the question through the technologies of the acquisition targets. 
However, the findings also provide a new perspective to the strategy employed 
by platform leaders. While four platform leaders were studied, they represent 
successful platform companies, indicating that their approach to acquisition is 
beneficial to other platform companies as well. 
Most importantly, this thesis finds strong evidence that Middleware technology 
has become strategic for platform leaders during platform wars. Furthermore, 
the findings suggest that unique middleware could generally be seen as the 
most important type of technology for the success of platforms. The empirical 
findings demonstrate that platform leaders put increased focus in MW 
acquisitions when fighting platform wars. This finding was consistent in all 
cases, regardless of the stack layers that were previously important to them, 
suggesting that platform companies should eventually need to develop a richer 
and more unique middleware layer to their software stack to be successful. In 
this thesis, the importance of MW was demonstrated through acquisitions, 
which could indicate a high pace of development in middleware layer. Being 
highly digital, the operating environment of platform leaders is very dynamic. In 
this environment, platform leaders can have a hard time predicting and 
developing internally all the digital technologies they will need in the future. 
Acquisitions can be used as a means of innovation (Puranam and Srikanth, 
2007) and substitute to internal R&D (Bower, 2001), and thus acquisitions 
could be especially important for developing MW technologies. 
This thesis finds multiple levers that can make MW strategic for platform 
leaders during platform wars. Firstly, building on previous research (Hagiu, 
2007; Tan et al., 2015; Koch and Windsperger, 2017), this thesis suggests 
platform leaders focus on acquiring MW technologies to actively drive their 
platform development by increasing innovation speed. MW components are re-
usable by nature (Schmidt and Buschmann, 2003), and can provide services to 
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support AS layer components. Furthermore, MW components can make AS layer 
component development easier and allow platform leaders to develop new 
functionalities to their platform more quickly. As sustained competitive 
advantage could be achieved by actively shaping competitive environment 
(Koch and Windsperger, 2017), this increase in innovation speed can provide an 
edge over competing platforms.  
Secondly, this thesis also suggests that MW acquisitions are used to acquire 
technology that could radically improve the user interactions with the platform. 
This suggestion emerges from the empirical finding that each case company had 
acquired user-interface related MW technologies, such as Virtual Reality and 
Virtual Assistant technology. User-side network effects are critical in most of the 
key platforms of the case companies, and delivering user experience is done 
with Application Software. However, AS relies on the MW layer below to deliver 
the user experience, and thus these MW components are key in improving it. 
Hence, the increase of middleware acquisitions could be tied to platform 
leaders’ efforts to improve their platforms’ interactions.  
This thesis also finds evidence that technology acquisitions can have a 
significant role in the coring and tipping strategies of platform leaders (Gawer 
and Cusumano, 2008). The findings fit into the notion that platform companies 
should first focus on developing their platform core, following a coring strategy 
(Gawer and Cusumano, 2008). In acquisitions, this coring strategy is executed 
by acquiring companies in the same layers where the acquirers’ platform cores 
are. These targets can provide the acquirer beneficial technologies or talent, but 
also users if the target has a competing platform. To win platform wars with a 
tipping strategy or “platform envelopment” (Gawer and Cusumano, 2008; 
Eisenmann, Parker and Van Alstyne, 2011), companies could use acquisitions in 
multiple ways. The focus of acquisitions on user-experience-enhancing MW 
technologies could support platform envelopment: if a platform is able to 
deliver clearly superior user experience, the benefits gained by users who 
switch to this platform can overcome the switching costs of using a competing 
platform. Thus, MW acquisitions can serve a critical part of the tipping strategy 
of platform leaders. The findings also suggest that platform leaders seek to 
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enable their own technology-driven platform envelopment efforts, while 
simultaneously protecting from similar efforts by their competitors, by 
acquiring rare middleware technologies before competitors do. This 
competitive driver in middleware acquisitions also serves to complement 
existing acqui-hiring research (Coyle and Polsky, 2013; Sawicki, 2015), 
suggesting that platform leaders make acqui-hires also to simultaneously both 
enable and defend from platform envelopment attacks by acquiring rare talent, 
thus justifying the high costs of such measures. As a lot of scarce talent lies in 
MW technology companies, this also serves as a lever for making MW strategic. 
This thesis does not find evidence for synergistic benefits of technology 
acquisitions, suggesting that a larger technology base might not encourage 
platform leaders to make acquisitions that benefit multiple technology areas at 
once. This relates to the decision whether to grow a platform in breadth, where 
the platform company “needs to trade off the synergies, economies of scale 
and/or network effects created by novel search or shared costs reductions 
against the increasing complexity costs and diseconomies of specialization, 
which occur when the platform acquires new dimensions” (Hagiu, 2014). While 
supporting evidence was not found for the hypothesis on synergistic benefits for 
SS layer, the results are more mixed for the synergy hypothesis for MW layer, 
and the synergistic benefits might still be a driver of MW acquisitions. However, 
this might be less likely as multiple drivers for MW acquisitions already arise 
from the findings and existing research. This could be a reassuring indication for 
new platform companies, suggesting that they can still rise among the platform 
leaders even if their technology base is clearly less developed.  
These findings should be of interest for both academia and industry. For 
academia, this thesis further validates the viability of the software stack as a 
model to analyze technology companies, and provides insights on how platform 
leaders use acquisitions to fight platform wars. It also advances the conceptual 
understanding of how software stack can describe the technological foundations 
of a platform. By describing the acquisition activity of the world’s leading 
platform companies, this thesis supports managers in their effort to create 
strategies for developing new and existing platforms. 
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5.1 Alternative explanations 
Section 5 Discussion and conclusions above provides an interpretation of the 
results, aligned with existing research and theories. However, the empirical 
findings can also have alternative explanations, which are more speculative and 
emerge from the empirical data rather than the theory base of this thesis. This 
section goes through these explanations, and explains the rationales behind 
them. The validity of these alternative explanations need to be addressed in 
future research to improve the confidence of the implications presented in 
section 5 Discussion and conclusions above.  
Explanation 1 – Middleware Services is the only stack layer that currently 
has room for significant technological differentiation between platform 
companies 
Software stacks, which cover all digital technologies, have been under 
development since the early days of computing. Whereas during early days the 
development focused on Hardware and System Software layer components, the 
rise of internet shifted the focus towards higher layers of Application Software 
and Middleware Services. From a technological maturity perspective, it would 
make sense that the layers that have been in the focus of development are more 
commoditized, thus making it easy to build or buy technology in the layer 
without acquisitions.  
Modern web applications can be built with software stacks that have little 
emphasis on own Middleware Services components, as software development 
frameworks for developing Application Software components are abundant. 
This has caused commoditization in the Application Software layer, making it 
harder to achieve competitive advantage with simply distinct Application 
Software. However, as the high acquisition intensities and continuous 
emergence of new AS development frameworks demonstrate, many kinds of 
Middleware Services components are underdeveloped, and thus provide an 
opportunity for differentiation. Acquisitions serve to speed up this 
differentiation, as well as to slow down the catching up of competition through 
locking in scarce, specialized talent. 
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Explanation 2 – Layers develop in cycles, and Middleware Services layer’s 
development is simply peaking now 
History has many examples of digital innovations or inventions that spark a 
wave of innovation to follow. Semiconductors brought upon a wave of 
development in System Software layer, including operating systems and 
databases, and similarly internet has brought upon the need to develop 
browsers and websites. With the current continuing development of 
computational power and increased amount of data, development for more data 
and computationally intensive Middleware Services components has hastened.  
It is possible that the increased interest in Middleware Services layer 
technology would be in part caused by the developments in computational 
power and data storage, which has increased the amount of technological 
innovation happening in the layer by enabling more data and computationally 
intensive software. Consequently, a growing amount of companies working in 
the field would give rise to more technologies that large platform companies 
would benefit from. The platform leaders have a rich technology base behind 
them, making technologies in every layer of the stack relevant for them. 
Explanation 3 – Platform competitive advantage is built with distinct 
technology 
Each of the case companies can be considered a technology company and their 
platforms, like all digital offerings, require technology in all parts of the stack to 
operate. The implementation on each layer can be done in-house by the 
company, or they can allow third parties to develop or provide the technology to 
their software stack. Generally, a fully outsourced stack is easy to imitate as the 
used technology is available to anyone, and a fully in-house software stack is 
harder to imitate as far as any third parties don’t offer suitable substitutes for 
the used in-house technologies. 
With this dynamic in mind, a platform company might pursue technological 
differentiation by acquiring or developing unique solutions to stack layers 
where suitable third party substitutes are scarce or nonexistent. In practice, 
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such differentiation could in part enable superior user experience, developer 
tools, scalability, or other benefits that keep the platform more attractive than 
the competing ones. In this scenario, acquiring technology companies can give 
access to emerging technologies in fields where talent and assets are scarce. 
Such acquisitions can be seen in the findings, with many acquisitions happening 
in the fields of Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, Augmented or Virtual 
Reality, and many more. 
5.2 Limitations and future research 
While previous research has touched upon a multiple of drivers, which also lead 
to the hypotheses of this research, the results need to be further validated as no 
statistical tests are performed.  
While the stack model is a widely used framework in the IT industry (Gerstner, 
2003), it comes with its limitations. The layered model simplifies the 
technological components into layers, and assumes that all components in a 
layer are alike. Yet, there are big differences in the functionality as well as 
complementarity between different pairs of components in one layer (Gao and 
Iyer, 2006), and the aforementioned assumption does not always hold. Thus, the 
software stack lacks the granularity to accurately describe the interplay of 
technological components. This means that a platform’s core, for example, is 
assumed to cover an entire layer, rather than specific components in the layer.  
When acquisitions are linked to the layer, it is similarly assumed that they relate 
to the entire layer rather than the specific components of the platform core in 
the layer, while these components might be intended to serve as components to 
different platforms altogether. For example, in the case of Google, their 
advertising engine forms their MW core layer, but they might buy a Voice 
recognition company to the MW layer. These acquisitions seem to be highly 
similar from the stack model perspective – they are in the same layer after all – 
but perhaps serve as components to two separate offerings like AdWords and a 
Virtual assistant. Similarly, the generic nature of the stack model leaves multiple 
explanations for increased acquisitive behavior. For example, the small increase 
in Apple’s SS acquisition amount could be interpreted as a sign of Apple 
Luiro 10.4.2018 
 51 
receiving synergistic benefits from having core layers in HW, SS, and MW layers, 
but also as a focused investment to support its core layer in SS. 
M&A data does not reveal technological pivots, e.g. buying in a team and making 
them work on something that is different from their initial focus, but matches 
their capabilities. Such cases can lead to misallocation in the stack. Similarly, for 
some companies there is only little data available about what they do, and this 
can also cause them to be misallocated in the stack. Sometimes the targets can 
also have technology in multiple layers of the stack, but as the targets are often 
small companies, this thesis simplifies their technological focus to just one stack 
layer.  
These issues highlight the challenges of an outside-in view taken in this thesis, 
and thus there is a need for in-depth single case studies to further validate the 
insights of this thesis. Furthermore, single-case studies could also better study 
the internal technological development efforts of platform leaders, and integrate 
the findings of this thesis to form a perspective on how the development of 
technology relates to the planned competitive strategy of MSPs. 
While the findings of this thesis need to be further validated, they are well 
aligned between case companies and provide a base of theory for understanding 
platform leaders’ technology acquisitions. However, the method lacks statistical 
tests, and does not address the degree to which the different explanations 
account for the observed behavior. Additionally, the benefit of the acquisition 
activity of platform leaders is not quantified, but rather assumed high enough to 
make their acquisition strategies good. Further studies could seek to 
quantitatively understand how big the role of these strategies is for platform 
companies. While this thesis studies only four platform leaders, there are not 
many such platform leaders around, and thus the sample of the most formidable 
technology titans covers a significant portion of all platform leaders. As this 
thesis already describes the acquisition behavior of some of the most important 
MSPs, it remains an interesting view on how the most successful MSPs make 
acquisitions. Regardless, a larger sample could further validate the implications 
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of this thesis, and include MSPs that have not been as successful to understand 
what kind of acquisition behavior could predict worse performance. 
It is important to note that while this thesis provides insights on the acquisition 
strategies that current platform leaders use, acquisitions are only one part of 
the strategies that made these companies platform leaders. Furthermore, while 
this thesis describes the acquisition strategies of platform leaders during the 
ongoing platform wars, it remains to be seen which companies come out of the 
war as winners. 
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Appendix 
Table 18 Number of Google's yearly acquisitions by stack layer 
 
‘03 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09 ‘10 ‘11 ‘12 ‘13 ‘14 ‘15 ‘16 ‘17* Total 
AS 1 1 1 3 2 2 0 3 9 3 0 4 1 2 0 32 
MW 1 1 0 5 4 2 2 18 11 5 9 17 7 8 6 96 
SS 1 0 1 0 3 0 0 5 0 1 2 5 1 1 0 20 
HW 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 6 
Total 3 2 2 8 10 4 2 27 20 11 12 27 9 11 6 154 
*Year to 10/2017 
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Table 19 Number of Apple's yearly acquisitions by stack layer 
 
‘97 ‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09 ‘10 ‘11 ‘12 ‘13 ‘14 ‘15 ‘16 ‘17* Total 
AS 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 0 5 
MW 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 4 0 1 6 5 8 3 4 38 
SS 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 1 1 1 0 12 
HW 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 2 1 0 1 11 
Total 1 0 1 1 2 4 0 0 1 2 0 1 2 5 0 4 12 9 10 6 5 66 
* Year to 10/2017 
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Table 20 Number of Facebook's yearly acquisitions by stack layer 
 
‘07 ‘08 ‘09 ‘10 ‘11 ‘12 ‘13 ‘14 ‘15 ‘16 ‘17* Total 
AS 0 0 0 6 7 5 4 3 1 1 1 28 
MW 1 0 0 3 2 2 2 5 2 5 2 24 
SS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 
HW 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Total 1 0 0 9 9 7 6 9 3 8 3 55 
*Year to 10/2017 
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Table 21 Number of Amazon's yearly acquisitions by stack layer 
 
‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09 ‘10 ‘11 ‘12 ‘13 ‘14 ‘15 ‘16 ‘17* Total 
AS 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 5 2 3 4 2 3 3 0 0 2 28 
MW 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 1 4 2 5 16 
SS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 3 
HW 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 
Total 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 5 2 4 6 2 6 5 5 3 7 49 
*Year to 10/2017 
 
